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The notorious Wigner’s friend thought experiment (and modifications thereof) has in recent years
received renewed interest especially due to new arguments that force us to question some of the
fundamental assumptions of quantum theory. In this paper, we formulate a no-go theorem for the
persistent reality of Wigner’s friend’s perception, which allows us to conclude that the perceptions
that the friend has of her own measurement outcomes at different times cannot "share the same real-
ity”, if seemingly natural quantum mechanical assumptions are met. More formally, this means that,
in a Wigner’s friend scenario, there is no joint probability distribution for the friend’s perceived mea-
surement outcomes at two different times, that depends linearly on the initial state of the measured
system and whose marginals reproduce the predictions of unitary quantum theory. This theorem
entails that one must either (1) propose a nonlinear modification of the Born rule for two-time predic-
tions, (2) sometimes prohibit the use of present information to predict the future –thereby reducing
the predictive power of quantum theory– or (3) deny that unitary quantum mechanics makes valid
single-time predictions for all observers. We briefly discuss which of the theorem’s assumptions are
more likely to be dropped within various popular interpretations of quantum mechanics.
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most puzzling scenarios one can encounter
in quantum physics is the so-called Wigner’s friend
thought experiment [1]. It allows to investigate the ap-
plicability of the quantum formalism beyond its usual
limits, by considering a certain physical system –called
“the friend”– simultaneously as a quantum system and
as a user of quantum theory (observer). There has been
a number of recent works that cast new light onto this
thought experiment [2–16], many of which originated as
reactions to a paper by Frauchiger and Renner [17]. The
latter work can be regarded as showing that, in quan-
tum mechanics, it may be problematic to treat observa-
tional knowledge of other agents as if it were one’s own,
and to logically compare such indirect knowledge with
that gained through direct observation. In the words
of these authors, in a scenario where “multiple agents
have access to different pieces of information, and draw
conclusions by reasoning about the information held
by others”, it can be shown that, “in the general con-
text of quantum theory, the rules for such nested rea-
soning may be ambiguous” [17]; a conclusion that is
reminescent of the Qbist interpretation of quantum the-
ory [18, 19].
In the present paper, we put forward a no-go theo-
rem for the persistent reality of Wigner’s friend’s perception
that has perhapsmore counter-intuitive and drastic con-
sequences: Even a single observer, when making pre-
dictions about his or her observations at two different
times, can conflict with the linear dependence of quan-
tum mechanical probabilities on the density matrix of
the system being measured. This will occur if said ob-
server is subjected to a measurement by a superobserver
between these two times and uses unitary quantumme-
chanics to make his or her predictions. Our result is in
line with a different understanding of the Frauchiger-
Renner argument, where it is taken to primarily show
that inferences made on the basis of a quantum state
assigned at a certain time are not necessarily valid at
later times, especially not if “someone Hadamards your
brain” in between [20].
Indeed, one conclusion that can be drawn from this
no-go theorem is that treating a piece of information
from the past as if it was still presently existing (even
when one takes into account a possible subjective un-
certainty) cannot in general be upheld together with the
conjunction of the above seemingly natural assumptions
within the domain of quantum theory. We will show
that in a particular instance of theWigner’s friend exper-
iment, our assumptions imply that, even in cases where
the theory states that no change would take place in the
quantum state of the friend’s laboratory, the perceptions
of the friend have a non-zero probability to change from
before to after Wigner’s measurement. Finally, we will
briefly discuss how different interpretations of quantum
mechanics might comply with the no-go theorem, by
identifying which of the assumptions are most likely to
be abandoned within these interpretations.
II. WIGNER’S FRIEND THOUGHT EXPERIMENT
Let us begin by reviewing the Wigner’s friend
thought experiment within a unitary formalism to set
up some basic notation, and to clarify what we mean by
unitary quantum mechanicss. It is common to assume that
the following description provided by unitary quantum
mechanics is empirically adequate in all situations: any
observer which uses this formalism will predict proba-
2bilities that match the relative frequencies that would be
observed if the experiment was repeated many times.
The experiment features an observer, the friend (F),
performing measurements on a qubit (e.g., a spin-1/2
particle), the system (S), in a sealed laboratory. The sys-
tem is initialized in the state |ψ〉S = α| ↑〉S + β| ↓〉S,
where α and β are complex numbers that obey |α|2 +
|β|2 = 1, and the possible outcomes of the measurement
are recorded by the friend asU or D, respectively stand-
ing for "up" and "down". Another (super-)observer,
Wigner (W), located outside the laboratory, performs
measurements on both the system and the friend. The
initial state of the friend (which encompasses any other
possible degree of freedom in the isolated lab) is known
byWigner, and is initially in a macroscopic "ready" state
|0〉F. The state ofWigner himself is also in amacroscopic
“ready” state |0〉W .
The initial state (at time t0) of the whole setup is there-
fore
|Ψ(t0)〉 = |ψ〉S|0〉F|0〉W = (α| ↑〉S + β| ↓〉S) |0〉F|0〉W .
(1)
At time t1, the friend measures the spin in the z-basis,
and the state becomes
|Ψ(t1)〉 = (α| ↑〉S|U〉F + β| ↓〉S|D〉F) |0〉W , (2)
where the states |U〉F , |D〉F correspond to the friend
having observed outcome “up” or “down” respectively.
Finally, at time t2, Wigner measures the friend and sys-
tem in some entangled basis, with binary outcomes cor-
responding to the orthogonal states
|1〉 = a| ↑,U〉+ b| ↓,D〉
|2〉 = b∗| ↑,U〉 − a∗| ↓,D〉,
with a, b being complex numbers obeying |a|2 + |b|2 =
1. This leads to the final state
|Ψ(t2)〉 =(αa∗ + βb∗)|1〉|1〉W + (αb− βa)|2〉|2〉W
=a(αa∗ + βb∗)| ↑〉S|U〉F|1〉W
+ b(αa∗ + βb∗)| ↓〉S|D〉F|1〉W (3)
+ b∗(αb− βa)| ↑〉S|U〉F|2〉W
− a∗(αb− βa)| ↓〉S|D〉F|2〉W ,
where |1〉W and |2〉W are pure quantum states corre-
sponding to Wigner seeing the outcome “1” or “2” re-
spectively.
The states in Eqs. (1)-(3) represent the unitary evolu-
tion of the full quantum state at all times. While the lat-
ter is commonly associated with the many-worlds inter-
pretation [21, 22], or with Bohmian mechanics [23–25], it
is also compatible with a timeless formulation of quan-
tum theory as introduced by Page and Wootters [26].
Evenwithin non-realistic interpretations of the quantum
state, where the state is merely a device for computing
probabilities, Eqs. (1)-(3) can be used by any observer
to make predictions about their observered outcome at
some time.
Using the states in Eqs. (1)-(3) and the Born rule, one
can find the expected statistics for any of the friend’s or
Wigner’s measurement outcomes using unitary quan-
tummechanics. This is achieved by applying a projector
Πx onto the state where the respective observer is seeing
outcome x to the state at the time of interest, i.e.
p(x) = tr (Πx|Ψ(t)〉〈Ψ(t)|) , (4)
where, for example, the probability of the friend seeing
outcome x = U is obtained with ΠU = |U〉〈U|F.
In the following, we will also be interested in cases
where the initial state of the system is a mixed state ρS.
Such a state can be decomposed as ρ = λ|ψ〉〈ψ|+ (1−
λ)|φ〉〈φ|, where |ψ〉, |φ〉 are orthonormal states and 0 ≤
λ ≤ 1. Then we have the analogue of expressions (1)-(3)
for the mixed state Σ(t) of the whole setup at different
times
Σ(t) = λ|Ψ(t)〉〈Ψ(t)|+ (1− λ)|Φ(t)〉〈Φ(t)|, (5)
where |Ψ(t)〉 and |Φ(t)〉 are states analogous to Eqs. (1)-
(3) with initial system states |ψ〉 and |φ〉 respectively.
Furthermore, probabilities are now given by p(x) =
tr (ΠxΣ(t)).
In the standard analysis of theWigner’s friend though
experiment, the friend is usually assumed to describe
the dynamics of her lab by using the state-update rule
instead of Eq. (2). She, therefore, would assign proba-
bilities to Wigner’s measurement that are different from
those assigned by Wigner based on Eqs. (2) and (3),
which leads to an inconsistency between the predictions
of both observers (see for example Ref. [5]).
III. PROBABILITY ASSIGNMENTS IN A SCIENTIFIC
THEORY
A necessary requirement for an empirically adequate
scientific theory is that it should be able to give (quan-
titative) predictions, such as to have testable empirical
content. Namely, a theory should be able to associate
a measure of likelihood to an event y to happen, given
that certain conditions –that in turn are captured by an-
other event x– have already occurred. 1 In the words of
Wigner,
"One realises that all the information which
the laws of physics provide consists of prob-
ability connections between subsequent im-
pressions that a system makes on one if one
interacts with it repeatedly, i.e., if one makes
repeated measurements on it." [1]
The theory should thus be able to answer questions
of the form: “given that I observed event x at time t1,
1 Throughout the text we use event in the sense of probability theory.
3how likely is it that I will observe event y at a later
time t2?”. Mathematically speaking, such a question is
answered by specifying a conditional probability distri-
butions p(y|x). On that note, a recent work about the
emergence of physical laws is based on the idea that the
primary purpose of such laws is to give the conditional
probability distributions relating events perceived by an
observer at two subsequent times [27].
In the context of the Wigner’s friend thought exper-
iment, we are thus interested in the friend’s question:
"given that I saw outcome f1 at time t1, what is the prob-
ability (attributed by using quantum theory) that I will
see outcome f2 at time t2?". We assume that quantum
mechanics is empirically adequate and is able to answer
this question by providing a conditional probability dis-
tribution p( f2| f1). Moreover, note that (unitary) quan-
tum theory also prescribes how to assign a probability
for observations at a single time (one-time probabilities)
p( f1) by Eq. (4).
2 Given these elements, the standard
axiomatization of probability theory allows the defini-
tion of a joint probability distribution through the iden-
tity p( f1, f2) = p( f1| f2)p( f2). Thus, any theory that,
like quantum mechanics, prescribes rules to assign one-
time probabilities and conditional probabilities, auto-
matically allows to assign joint probability distributions.
However, as we will see, such a joint probability dis-
tribution cannot simultaneously fulfill three seemingly
natural assumptions in a Wigner’s friend scenario.
IV. NO-GO THEOREM FOR THE PERSISTENT
REALITY OF WIGNER’S FRIEND’S PERCEPTION
We now formulate a formal no-go theorem which
shows that in Wigner’s friend scenarios, the friend can-
not treat her perceivedmeasurement outcome as having
reality across multiple times without contradicting what
might appear to be core assumptions of quantum me-
chanics. Consider the following assumptions, whose
justification will be provided in Sec. IVA:
P1 The events f1 and f2, corresponding to the per-
ceived measurement records of the friend at times
t1 and t2, respectively, can be combined into a joint
event to which is assigned a probability distribu-
tion p( f1, f2). Moreover, the rules of the probabil-
ity calculus imply that p( f1) = ∑ f2 p( f1, f2) and
p( f2) = ∑ f1 p( f1, f2).
P2 One-time probabilities are assigned without re-
sorting to the state-update rule (i.e., using unitary
2 It is worth stressing that one-time probabilities are fundamentally
also themselves conditional probabilities, namely conditioned on
all the possible past events that can influence the probability of the
event that we are trying to predict.
quantum theory, where no “collapse” is consid-
ered to occur). Thus, when the initial state of the
qubit is |ψ〉,
p( fi) = tr(| fi〉〈 fi|F|Ψ(ti)〉〈Ψ(ti)|), (6)
with |Ψ(ti)〉 being the unitarily evolved global
state according to Eqs. (2), (3).
P3 The joint probability of the friend’s perceived out-
comes p( f1, f2) has a convex linear dependence on
the initial state ρS of the system qubit.
We will now show that these assumptions lead to a
contradiction when applied to the friend in a Wigner’s
friend scenario. We begin with a lemma.
Lemma IV.1 If p(a, b) is a probability distribution that is
convex-linear in some state ρS, and if the marginal p(a) sat-
isfies p(a) = tr(|a〉〈a|ρ), where |a〉 ∈ HS is an orthonormal
basis and a ∈ {1, ..., dimHS}, then p(b|a) := p(a,b)p(a) is inde-
pendent of ρ.
Proof The Riesz representation theorem implies that the
joint probability p(a, b), since it is linear in the initial
state ρ ∈ HS, can be represented using the Hilbert-
Schmidt inner product as
p(a, b) = tr(Eabρ), (7)
where {Eab} is a set of operators on HS. The require-
ment that p(a, b) be a valid probability distribution for
all normalized quantum states ρ implies that {Eab} is a
POVM. Naimark’s theorem states that this POVM can
be dilated to an isometry V : HS → HA ⊗ HB ⊗ HE,
whereHE is some ancillary Hilbert space, so that
p(a, b) = tr(|a〉〈a|A ⊗ |b〉〈b|B ⊗ IE VρV†). (8)
When ρ = |a′〉〈a′| for some a′ ∈ {1, ..., dimHS},
the probability of getting outcome a is p(a) =
tr(|a〉〈a|a′〉〈a′|) = δa,a′ , so by Eq. (8) we have V|a′〉 =
|a′〉A|φa′〉BE, for some normalized states |φa′〉BE. There-
fore, for a general input state ρ = ∑ij ρij|i〉〈j|,
p(a, b) = ∑
ij
ρij tr
(|a〉〈a|A ⊗ |b〉〈b|B ⊗ IE
· |i〉〈j|A ⊗ |φi〉〈φj|BE
)
= ρaa tr(|b〉〈b|B ⊗ IE |φa〉〈φa|BE)
= p(a) tr(|b〉〈b|B ⊗ IE |φa〉〈φa|BE).
This shows that
p(b|a) = tr(|b〉〈b|B ⊗ IE |φa〉〈φa|BE) (9)
is independent of the input state ρ.
Theorem IV.2 The conjunction of the assumptions P1-P3
cannot be satisfied for theWigner’s friend thought experiment
for a general choice of Wigner’s measurement basis.
4Proof Consider the setup described in section II.
When the system qubit is prepared in a pure state
and the friend is in a “ready” state, such that
|Ψ(t0)〉 = (α|0〉S + β|1〉S)|0〉F, assumption P2 implies
that, at time t1, p( f1) = tr(| f1〉〈 f1|F|Ψ(t1)〉〈Ψ(t1)|) =
tr(| f1〉〈 f1|S|ψ〉〈ψ|S), i.e., p( f1 = U) = |α|2 and p( f1 =
D) = |β|2. Using assumption P3 to extend, by convex
linearity, the initial state |ψ〉S to a general state ρ, we get
that p( f1) = tr(| f1〉〈 f1|Sρ), while Lemma IV.1 implies
that the conditional probability p( f2| f1) must be inde-
pendent of ρ. So, when the initial state of the system
|ψ〉S = α|0〉S + β|1〉S is pure, we can write
p( f2 = U) = ∑
f1
p( f2 = U| f1)p( f1) = A|α|2 + B|β|2,
(10)
where A := p( f2 = U| f1 = U) and B := p( f2 =
U| f1 = D) are independent of α, β but may depend on
the parameters a, b describing Wigner’s measurement.
We claim that Eq. (10) is in contradiction with the single-
time probabilities that one would get by applying as-
sumption P2 at time t2, namely
p( f2 = U) = |α|2(|a|4 + |b|4) + 2|abβ|2
+(αa∗β∗b+ α∗aβb∗)(|a|2 − |b|2) (11)
Indeed, when choosing α = 1, β = 0, Eqs. (10) and (11)
together imply that A = |a|4 + |b|4, and when choos-
ing α = 0, β = 1 they imply B = 2|ab|2. Remem-
bering that A, B must be independent of α, β, putting
these expressions for A, B into Eq. (10) and evaluating
that equation for general α, β yields a contradiction with
Eq. (11). This shows that there exists no joint probabil-
ity p( f1, f2) that is linear in the initial system state ρ and
whose marginals satisfy the probability rule of unitary
quantum theory.
A. Motivation of the assumptions
We attempt here to motivate each of the assumptions
of our no-go theorem. We can only offer plausibility
arguments, since, as we have already shown, these as-
sumptions cannot in general all hold true in quantum
mechanics. It should also be noted that the assumptions
are not logically independent: for example one cannot
hold P3 without at the same time assuming P1.
As discussed in Secs. II and III, quantum the-
ory –as any other predictive theory– should pro-
vide us with conditional probability distributions for
the friend’s perceptions before and after Wigner’s
measurement, i.e. p( f2| f1), and it also provides
single time probabilities for the friend’s perception:
p( f1) = tr (| f1〉〈 f1|F⊗ |Ψ(t1)〉〈Ψ(t1)|) and p( f2) =
tr (| f2〉〈 f2|F⊗ |Ψ(t2)〉〈Ψ(t2)|). Thus we should in prin-
ciple be able to construct a joint probability distribu-
tion for the friend’s perceived outcomes at two differ-
ent times, p( f1, f2). Even if one initially only assigns
probabilities to events directly perceived by an observer,
such as f1 and f2, the requirement of predictability for a
theory leads us to assign probabilities to the joint event
( f1, f2), although this is not a directly perceivable event
in its own (arguably, one cannot have direct perceptions
about two different times).
Assumption P1 can also be understood as a spe-
cial case of the general assumption that measurement
records are facts of the world [2], or of the absoluteness
of observed events (AOE) – the assumption that "an ob-
served event is a real single event, and not relative to
anything or anyone" [8, 14] – applied to events f1 and f2.
It is important to emphasize that the negation of AOE is
not necessarily the claim that measurements outcomes
are observer-dependent. Indeed the observed events
in assumption P1 are all associated with the same ob-
server, and thus P1 is conceptually different from the
version of AOE used in deriving the no-go theorem of
Ref. [8], which is about joint probability assignments for
the measurement outcomes of multiple observers.
P2 can be justified by appealing to the belief that inter-
pretations of quantum mechanics should be empirically
equivalent, i.e., that they all yield the same experimen-
tal predictions. Since P2 definitely holds in certain in-
terpretations, notably in the Everett interpretation [21],
one should then expect P2 to hold generally. Since P2
can in principle be tested empirically, it is appropriate to
regard quantum mechanics with objective collapse [28]
as a different physical theory from unitary quantumme-
chanics, and not merely a different interpretation [5].
Assumption P3 can be understood as an extension of
the Born rule –which assigns single-time probabilities
linearly in the quantum state– to joint events at multi-
ple times. P3 is true in usual laboratory situations where
the usual quantum mechanical state-update rule can be
used to calculate probabilities. Moreover, P3 can be mo-
tivated operationally, in a way that is customary in the
context of generalized probabilistic theories [29, 30]. We
can imagine that a third agent is preparing the initial
state of the system qubit, independently from the friend
and Wigner. One might assume that, after fully speci-
fying all relevant details for the friend’s and Wigner’s
measurement setups (this includes the measurement ba-
sis for both of them, the initial quantum state of the
friend, etc.), the probabilities p( f1, f2) only depend on
the quantum state ρS but not on the way that the state
was prepared. Suppose that pσ( f1, f2) and pτ( f1, f2) are
the probability distributions when the system state σ or
τ is prepared. Since ρ = λσ + (1 − λ)τ can be pre-
pared by tossing a biased coin which leads to prepare
σ with probability λ, and τ otherwise, the linearity of
probability implies that pρ( f1, f2) = λpσ( f1, f2) + (1−
λ)pτ( f1, f2). Another justification for allowing proba-
bilistic mixtures is that it implies that optimal compres-
sion is equivalent to linear compression [31, 32].
5V. IMPLICATIONS OF THE NO-GO THEOREM
A. The no-go theorem in different interpretations of
quantum mechanics
As mentioned above, strategies for coping with the
no-go theorem Thm. IV.2, i.e. deciding which of the as-
sumptions one is most likely to drop, will depend on
one’s interpretation of quantum theory. In what follows
we will go through each of the assumptions and for
each give examples of a prominent interpretation that
would reject it. We do not strive here for exhaustivity,
but rather to give an impression of the variety of ways
in which our theorem can be understood. In the interest
of space, our representation of any interpretation will be
rather superficial.
P1 According to our understanding, the Everett (or
many-worlds) interepretation [21, 22] denies that it
is meaningful to assign a joint probability p( f1, f2)
to the friend’s observations at multiple times. This
is at least Bell’s diagnostic:
"Everett [...] tries to associate each par-
ticular branch at the present time with
some particular branch at any past time
in a tree-like structure, in such a way
that each representative of an observer
has actually lived through the particu-
lar past that he remembers. In my opin-
ion this attempt does not succeed and
is in any case against the spirit of Ev-
erett’s emphasis on memory contents as
the important thing. We have no access
to the past, but only to present memo-
ries." [33]
Only in situations where a sufficient amount of
decoherence is present is it possible to identify
"worlds" branching in time, which would allow to
meaningfully speak of p( f1, f2). By construction,
this is not the case in Wigner’s friend scenario.
Further, note that operational approaches [2]
might only allow for the assignment of probabil-
ities that can in principle be measured. This is not
the case for the friend here, because in a Wigner’s
friend experiment there is no reliable record of f1
that remains available at time t2.
P2 There are at least two ways that this assumption
can be denied: objective collapse of the wave func-
tion, or subjective collapse of the wave function.
In a theory with objective collapse [28], not only
would P2 be false, but the predictions that Wigner
makes using Eq. (3) would be verifiably wrong. In
a theory with subjective state assignments such as
QBism [18], an agent is normatively constrained
to use the Born rule for computing probabilities,
but the quantum state used for doing so is up to
the agent’s good judgment; furthermore, QBism
prohibits agents from assigning quantum states to
themselves [19]. Therefore there can be subjective
collapse: the friend would have the right to use
the usual state update rule in order to calculate
p( f2| f1) – and thus not recover p( f2) according to
Eq. (6) – while Wigner uses unitary evolution for
his own predictions.
P3 In the de Broglie-Bohm interpretation [23–25], the
memory of the friend has a definite and observer-
independent value at all times and P1 holds. Fur-
thermore, it can be proven that Bohmian mechan-
ics recovers the same predictions as unitary quan-
tum mechanics so that P2 holds [23, 24]. Therefore
it must be P3 that fails to hold in that interpreta-
tion. It would be interesting for future work to de-
termine how p( f1, f2) depends on the input quan-
tum state within a Bohmian description.
B. The (non-)persistence of memory
Theorem IV.2 has been derived by assuming that in
Wigner’s choice of measurement basis, the parameters
a, b are arbitrary. However, it is interesting to look at
special choices of a and b for which the conclusions of
the theorem can be avoided and a probability distribu-
tion p( f1, f2) can be assigned that respects all assump-
tions of the theorem. We shall see that in the special
case where Wigner’s measurement corresponds to max-
imally entangled states, i.e. |1〉 = 1/√2(|↑〉S |U〉F +
|↓〉S |D〉F) and |2〉 = 1/
√
2(|↑〉S |U〉F − |↓〉S |D〉F), as-
sumptions P1-P3 allow to draw counterintuitive conclu-
sions about the time-evolution of the friends memory.
In the case of a = 1, b = 0 (or a = 0, b = 1) we
find that p( f2) = p( f1), namely p(U) = α
2, p(D) = β2.
Moreover, this measurement means that Wigner’s per-
ception gets perfectly correlated with the friend’s per-
ception |Ψ(t2)〉 = α| ↑〉S|U〉F |1〉W + β| ↓〉S|D〉F |2〉W
and, hence, this setting can be thought of as Wigner
measuring what the friend observed. In this case we
can choose p( f2| f1) = δ f1, f2 without contradicting the
assumptions of Theorem IV.2.
Another interesting case, which constitutes the stan-
dard discussion of Wigner’s friend, is when a = b = 1√
2
,
i.e. when Wigner measures in the Bell basis. In that case
Eqs. (3) and (6) yield p( f2 = U) = p( f2 = D) =
1
2 (|α|2+
|β|2). Since Lemma IV.1 shows that p( f2| f1) must be
independent of ρ, we have to choose p( f2| f1) = 12 in
order to satisfy the assumptions of Thm. IV.2. This is
particularly surprising in the case where the initial state
is prepared with α = β = 1√
2
, because in that Wigner
performs a non-disturbance measurement [11]. This means
that the joint state of the friend and system is actually an
eigenstate of Wigner’s measurement. One would, there-
fore, expect that in this case, since the quantum state is
6not changed byWigner’s measurement, the friend’s per-
ceived result should remained unchanged as well; this
is implicitly assumed in most of the discussions on the
Wigner’s friend thought experiment (and explicitly, for
example, in Ref. [12]). We maintain, however, that this
conflicts with the assumption of quantum mechanical
linearity of probabilities: if p( f1, f2) is linear in ρ, the
friend’s perceived outcome must get flipped with prob-
ability 12 .
VI. CONCLUSION
From the point of view of Wigner, assuming that the
friend’s memory has a (unknown but definite) value is
akin to assuming a hidden-variable model. Bell-type ar-
guments involving twoWigners and two friends [2, 3, 8]
have shown that if we further make a locality assump-
tion on that hidden-variable model, it will not be pos-
sible to reproduce the quantum mechanical predictions.
In this paper, we have shown that even from the friend’s
perspective, treating the memory of her measurement
outcome as having a value throughout the experiment is
in conflict with important features of quantum mechan-
ics. More precisely, we have shown that it is not possible
to assign a joint probability to her observed outcomes at
two different times of the thought experiment, in a way
that is compatible with unitary marginal probabilities
and with the linear dependence of quantum mechanical
probabilities on quantum states.
How to understand this theoremwill depend on one’s
interpretation of quantum mechanics, but it seems that
interesting lessons can be drawn from various inter-
pretational points of view. Many popular interpre-
tations (excluding hidden-variable interpretations like
Bohmian mechanics) implicitly satisfy the principle that
legitimate probability assignments should depend lin-
early on the initial quantum state. It appears in light
of our theorem that the consequence of such a commit-
ment is that one must in general either prohibit the use
of present information to predict the future (drastically
scaling down the predictive power of quantum theory),
or deny that unitary quantum mechanics makes valid
single-time predictions on all scales. That such a radical
conclusion is necessary in general does not affect the fact
that for all practical purposes, i.e. in normal conditions
when sufficient amounts of decoherence is present, one
can continue to successfully use present information for
predictions.
Our results might also raise interesting questions
about the persistence of identity for the friend. If it is not
possible for the friend to use the Born rule –or any other
rule linear in the quantum state of the system– to as-
sign a joint probability distribution to her observed out-
comes before and after Wigner’s measurement, then to
what extent can the friend at these two different times be
considered the same agent? It is conceivable, although
counterintuitive, that the friend at t1 and the friend at
t2 should be legitimately considered to be two distinct
agents. 3 In that case one could reach similar conclu-
sions to the ones of Ref. [14], and say that the friend’s
outcome at t2 is not an event from the point of view of
the friend at t1, and vice-versa.
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